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Executive-Branch Rulemaking and Dispute Settlement in 
the World Trade Organization: A Proposal To Increase 
Public Participation 
Aubry D. Smith 
!NTRODUCTION 
On March 23, 1994, the Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA) announced a proposed agreement with Venezuela to alter 
the Clean Air Act rule.1 The agreement would have eliminated a 
discrepancy between the regulatory treatment of Venezuelan and 
American oil producers, thus facilitating Venezuelan exports to the 
United States.2 At the same time, however, it would have led to a 
slight increase in pollution levels in the northeastern United States 
and would have made it more difficult for the EPA to monitor the 
compliance of Venezuelan producers with the Clean Air.Act rule.3 
The EPA offered the rule change in return for Venezuela's promise 
not to pursue a complaint alleging that the Clean Air Act rule vio-
lated U.S. obligations under the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade (GATT).4 
1. See EPA Announces Fuel Plan for Venezuela; Threatened GATT Complaint Is Shelved, 
[11 Current Reports] Intl. Trade Rep. (BNA) 504, 504 (Mar. 30, 1994) [hereinafter EPA 
Announces]. 
2. Under the scheme of the final rule, U.S. refiners can use their own 1990 levels of the 
regulated pollutants as a baseline from which to reduce pollutant levels according to the 
rule's schedule. See Regulation of Fuels and Fuel Additives: Standards for Reformulated 
and Conventional Gasoline, 59 Fed. Reg. 7,716 (1994) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. § 80). 
Venezuela and other foreign producers will be subject to a baseline provided by the Clean 
Air Act. See EPA Announces, supra note 1, at 504. The deal struck with Venezuela would 
have allowed that country to operate under the regime applied to U.S. domestic refiners. See 
id.; see also Regulation of Fuels and Fuel Additives: Individual Foreign Refinery Baseline 
Requirements for Reformulated Gasoline, 59 Fed. Reg. 22,800 (1994) (to be codified at 40 
C.F.R. § 80). 
3. The olefin content of Venezuelan gasoline is three times higher than the U.S. refinery-
industry average. See EPA Announces, supra note 1, at 504. Olefins contribute to ozone 
formation. See id. In testimony designed to persuade Congress that the policy was unneces-
sary, Mary Nichols of the EPA testified that shifting to a nondiscriminatory policy would 
mean a less-than-one-percent increase in nitrogen oxide in the Northeast. See Marianne 
Lavelle, GATT Complaint Fouls Feds' Clean Air Oil Dea~ NATL. LJ., June 13, 1994, at Bl, 
B3. Reacting to this comment, Robert F. Housman, attorney with the Center for Interna-
tional Environmental Law in Washington D.C., stated that, "[a] 1 percent increase presents a 
significant environmental impact in a part of the country where states are struggling to 
achieve reductions of 5 percent per year." Id. at B3. 
4. See EPA Announces, supra note 1, at 504; Lavelle, supra note 3, at Bl. The term 
GATT in the past was used to refer both to the treaty, see General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade, opened for signature Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A3, 55 U.N.T.S. 188 [hereinafter GATT], 
and to the administering organization based in Geneva, Switzerland. As an organization, the 
GATT now has been superseded by the World Trade Organization. See Final Act Embody-
ing the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Apr. 15, 1994, 33 
1267 
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The details of this negotiated settlement had been hammered 
out during the course of secret meetings between Venezuela, the 
EPA, the Energy Department, and the office of the U.S. Trade 
Representative.5 Congress and the public learned of the compro-
mise after the leaking of a confidential cable from Secretary of 
State Warren Christopher to the U.S. Ambassador to Venezuela.6 
Shortly thereafter, Congress forced the EPA to abandon the deal by 
inserting a rider in a subsequent EPA appropriations bill that pre-
cluded the rule change.7 
After the EPA abandoned the rule change, Venezuela relodged 
its complaint, this time before a dispute-settlement panel of the 
World Trade Organization (WTO).s The United States has had a 
difficult time defending its policy under the rules of the GATT.9 
The policy would reduce pollution in the United States,10 but it 
clearly would discriminate against foreign producers. The United 
I.L.M. 1143 [hereinafter Uruguay Round Final Act]; Agreement Establishing the World 
Trade Organization, done on Apr. 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1144 [hereinafter WTO Agreement]. 
5. See EPA Announces, supra note 1, at 504. 
6. See id. at 504. 
7. See Pub. L. No. 103-327, 108 Stat. 2298, 2319 (1994). One administration official, how-
ever, contended that, given the largely negative comments received, the proposed rule 
change might not have been adopted even without the congressional action to block it. See 
U.S. Defends Gas Rules in WTO Against Charges of Discrimination, INSIDE U.S. TRADE, July 
7, 1995, at 9 [hereinafter U.S. Defends Gas Rules]. The official characterized the proposed 
rule change as "a limited attempt by EPA to determine whether there was a better solution." 
Id. 
8. Venezuela originally filed its complaint with the dispute-settlement mechanism of the 
GATT. However, it withdrew the complaint from the GATT mechanism and relodged it on 
January 20, 1995, with the newly established dispute-settlement mechanism of the WTO. 
This was the first case brought against the United States in the WTO. See Venezuela Moves 
Toward WTO Case in Reformulated Gas Dispute, INSIDE U.S. TRADE, Feb. 3, 1995, at 4. For 
an explanation of the WTO and its dispute-settlement proceedings, see infra Part I. 
9. At the time this Note went to press, a WTO dispute-settlement panel had ruled against 
the United States. See Kantor Says He's Inclined to Appeal Panel's Ruling in Venezuela Gas 
Case, [13 Current Reports] Intl. Trade Rep. (BNA) 100 (Jan. 24, 1996). United States Trade 
Representative Mickey Kantor stated that he intended to appeal the ruling but would con-
sider the views of Congress before making a final decision. Venezuela argued that the EPA's 
rule discriminates against foreign refineries and violates, among others, Articles I (most-
favorite-nation principle) and III (national-treatment principle) of the GATT. See U.S. De-
fends Gas Rules, supra note 7, at 8. Countering that allegation, the United States contended 
that the EPA rule, though facially discriminatory, did not discriminate in practice. By con-
trast, when it defended the ill-fated bargain with Venezuela to settle out of court, the United 
States expressed the view that the final EPA rule probably was incompatible with provisions 
of the GATT. Ira Shapiro, General Counsel for the U.S. Trade Representative, testified 
before Congress that the United States would have a difficult time defending its policy as 
compatible with the GATT. He stated that the burden would be on the United States to 
show that the discrimination is necessary, a difficult task given that the EPA has said that 
discrimination is not necessary within the meaning of the GATT Article XX to achieve the 
objectives of the Clean Air Act. See Venezuela Vows GATT Challenge Following House Vote 
on Gas Rules, INSIDE U.S. TRADE, Sept. 16, 1994, at 6. On the exception contained within 
Article XX of the GATT and the burden of proof to meet the definition of "necessary" 
within the meaning of that provision, see infra notes 36-37. 
10. See supra note 3. 
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States must prove that this discrimination is necessary - not in the 
view of U.S. regulators but under the terms of the GAIT - to 
promote environmental protection.11 
The dispute with Venezuela - referred to as the "Reformulated 
Gasoline Case" - is just one in a series of conflicts between envi-
ronmental protection and free trade arising in the context of the 
world's multilateral trade regime, first under the GAIT and now 
under the WT0.12 But the Reformulated Gasoline Case also exem-
plifies two broad consequences that global interdependence has had 
for the U.S. government. First, fewer matters of policy can be de-
termined solely by reference to domestic preferences. An increas-
ing range of national policies derives not from internal government 
but from government's interaction with foreign powers. This inter-
action leads to the second consequence of global interdependence 
- a change in the nature of government. Domestic policymaking 
traditionally has been shared among the three branches and opened 
to public scrutiny, while the government of foreign affairs has 
tended to be concentrated in the Executive Branch13 and conducted 
in secrecy.14 With the rise in global interdependence, matters of 
domestic government and foreign affairs overlap, and the domestic 
mode of government tends to give way to that of foreign affairs. 
As the Reformulated Gasoline Case suggests, this encroach-
ment threatens the democratic integrity of our domestic policy. It 
well may be that national rules often fail to reflect the legitimate 
concerns of foreign powers. This Note proceeds on the premise, 
however, that it would be against the public interest for executive-
branch agencies to seek to accommodate those concerns by negoti-
ating with foreign powers in utter secrecy without engaging in some 
11. On what discrimination is exempted under GA'IT Article XX from the GA'IT's gen-
eral ban on discriminatory treatment on grounds of "necessity," see infra notes 36-37. 
12. See generally Symposium, Environmental Quality and Free Trade: Interdependent 
Goals or Irreconcilable Conflict?, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1219 (1992); Symposium, Green-
ing the GATT: Setting the Agenda, _27 CoRNELL INTL. LJ. 447 (1994). 
13. See, e.g., HAROID HoNGJU KoH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY CoNSTITUTION 117-49 
(1990) (describing the gradual monopolization of the nation's foreign policy by the Executive 
Branch through a combination of executive initiative, congressional acquiescence, and judi-
cial tolerance). 
14. Laws promoting open government typically provide some sort of exemption when 
foreign affairs are concerned. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (1994) (allowing the President to 
declare by executive order the parameters of a broad national-security exemption that 
agency officials may invoke when information is requested under the Freedom of Informa-
tion Act); 5 U.S.C. § 553(a)(l) (1994) (exempting administrative rulemaking from the public-
notice-and-comment requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) when a "for-
eign affairs function of the United States" is involved); Federal Advisory Committee Act, 
Pub. L. No. 92-463, § 10, 86 Stat 770, 774, reprinted in 5 U.S.C. app. at 1375 (1994) (allowing 
the President or agency head to take exception to the Federal Advisory Committee Act's 
provisions relating to open meetings, public notice, public participation, and public availabil-
ity of documents when necessary in the interests of foreign policy). 
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form of systematic consultation with the range of domestic parties 
concerned.15 
Although the denouement of the Reformulated Gasoline Case 
appears as something of a triumph for popular sovereignty and 
open government, the forces that halted the rule change in that case 
do not operate consistently. Concern for environmental protection 
will not always comport with the interests of the U.S. oil industry, 
and thus congressional opposition will not always rise to the level it 
did in the Reformulated Gasoline Case.16 In the absence of a high-
profile concern, Congress rarely will interfere with executive-
branch rulemaking, and therefore the administrative agency re-
sponsible for a particular issue will control the development of pol-
icy. This is troubling because the general requirements ensuring 
public participation in agency rulemaking currently do not apply 
when that rulemaking is pursuant to an international agreement.17 
Given the rise in global interdependence, this foreign-affairs excep-
tion could result in a steady erosion of direct democratic control 
over domestic regulatory policies that conflict with free-trade rules. 
This Note argues that, because the Executive Branch increas-
ingly will be promulgating domestic regulatory rules intended to 
comply with the rules of the world-trading system, it is necessary to 
increase formal oversight of the Executive Branch's role in that 
context. Part I argues that the United States' participation in the 
WTO implies a substantial increase in the impact of foreign policy 
on domestic policy. Part II points out a loophole in Congress's at-
tempt to compensate for this increase by installing various devices 
to ensure political oversight of the Executive: the Executive 
Branch is subject, under the Uruguay Round Agreements Act 
(URAA),18 to formal oversight during the WTO dispute-settlement 
process only in connection with adjudicated settlements, not in con-
nection with negotiated settlements. Part III proposes that Con-
gress expand the application of provisions of the Trade Act of 1974 
that currently require the U.S. Trade Representative to consult pri-
15. See Brian J. Schoenborn, Public Participation in Trade Negotiations: Open Agree· 
ments, Openly Arrived At?, 4 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 103, 116-19 (1995) (arguing that 
public participation in trade negotiations would serve to check the power of government 
officials and better inform their decisions). 
16. Citgo, a Venezuelan refinery that currently commands five percent of the U.S. market 
in reformulated gasoline, would have been largely excluded from the U.S. market for three 
years, to the benefit of the Mobil and Sun oil companies. See Lavelle, supra note 3, at Bl. 
17. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(a)(l) (1994) (exempting rulemaking from the public-notice-and-
comment requirements of the APA "to the extent that there is involved ... [a] foreign affairs 
function of the United States"). As currently interpreted, the APA's foreign-affairs excep· 
tion applies, among others, when agencies issue, modify, or rescind rules in order to imple-
ment an international agreement See, e.g., International Bhd. of Teamsters v. Peila, 17 F.3d 
1478, 1486 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (holding that a rule modification pursuant to a mutual under-
standing with Mexico was within the foreign-affairs exception of § 553). 
18. Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, 108 Stat. 4809 (1994). 
March 1996] Note - World Trade Organization 1271 
vate-sector representatives representing both trade and nontrade 
interests while negotiating settlements. This Part also argues that 
Congress should extend the URAA procedures currently applica-
ble to rulemaking pursuant to adjudicated settlements to rulemak-
ing pursuant to negotiated settlements. 
J. THE IMPACT OF THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM ON 
U.S. DOMESTIC POLICY 
This Part argues that the expanding scope of law issued under 
the auspices of the WTO is cause for concern because the dispute-
settlement process may fail to consider the full range of national 
interests in the domestic government policies it affects. Section I.A 
describes the potentially vast scope of international trade law and 
how it can spill over into traditional domestic policy areas. Section 
I.B asserts that the WTO's dispute-settlement process, which deter-
mines the concrete impact of international trade law on domestic 
law, is biased in a way that threatens the integrity of domestic 
policy. 
A. The Expanding Scope of International Trade Law 
The range of issues affected by international trade law has ex-
panded greatly for three reasons. First, in recent years, the 
international trade regime has sought to broaden the scope of 
trade-related issues that are regulated. Originally, that regime was 
based on the founding GATI treaty, which only sought to alleviate 
restrictions on trade in goods.19 With the completion of the last 
round of multilateral trade negotiations, the general scope of the 
WTO's regime has broadened to include the trade in services.20 
The treaty on services creates a framework within which WTO 
members may commit to open their markets in the service sectors 
of their choice and to the degree that they specify. Commitments 
can involve arrangements such as the mutual recognition of profes-
sional qualifications, operating licenses, such as banking licenses, 
and standards, such as solvency ratios and other prudential 
regulations.21 
19. See GATI, supra note 4, 61 Stat. at A3, 55 U.N.T.S. at 188. 
20. See General Agreement on Trade in Services, annexed to WTO Agreement, supra 
note 4, 33 I.L.M. at 1167. Fifteen other treaties, all appended to the Uruguay Round Final 
Act, see Uruguay Round Fmal Act, supra note 4, deal with specific trade sectors or issues. 
Most relevant to the non-trade concerns - such as consumer health and safety - addressed 
in this Note are the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, 
done on Apr. 15, 1994, annexed to WTO Agreement, supra note 4, 33 I.L.M. at 1381; and the 
Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, done on Apr. 15, 1994, annexed to WTO Agree-
ment, supra note 4, 33 I.L.M. at 1427. 
21. See General Agreement on Trade in Services, annexed to WTO Agreement, supra 
note 4, 33 l.L.M. at 1167. 
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The second cause for the expanding impact of international 
trade law is the increased rigor of the regime. International trade 
law is now far less tolerant of measures that, though not designed to 
regulate trade, nonetheless impede it - so-called nontariff barriers. 
Initially, the international trade regime was concerned mainly with 
altering or eliminating national laws whose sole purpose was to reg-
ulate trade, such as the laws setting tariff rates and restricting im-
ports and exports through the use of quotas. Recently, however, as 
a consequence of international trade law's increased attention to 
nontariff barriers, few regulatory fields have escaped the reach of 
the international trade regime. 
Naturally, the more vigorously the architects of the interna-
tional regime have sought to free trade from the various national 
regulations that hamper it, the more their efforts have tended to 
impinge on the designs of other regulators. Conflict with the regu-
lation of environmental law has been most controversial,22 but 
health-and-safety rules also have been affected. For example, the 
United States has claimed that a European Union ban on the use of 
hormones in beef production, enacted following a vigorous cam-
paign by consumer groups, violated the Agreement on Technical 
Barriers to Trade, which prohibits nondiscriminatory measures that 
, constitute unnecessary barriers to trade.23 Similarly, U.S. health 
rules came under fire in a transatlantic dispute over procymidone 
residues in French and Italian wines. United States officials banned 
these wines because the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) had 
not yet established tolerance levels for procymidone in wines. 
Though scientific studies suggested that procymidone is a carcino-
gen and a reproductive toxin, Europeans prevailed upon the FDA 
hastily to set tolerance levels by accusing the United States of a 
trade violation similar to that alleged by the United States in the 
hormones dispute.24 
22. See generally supra note 12. 
23. See John H. Jackson, Dolphins and Hormones: GATT and the Legal Environment for 
International Trade after the Uruguay Round, 14 U. ARK. LITrLE RocK L.J. 429, 435 (1992). 
The United States now contends that the honnone ban is not based on "sound science" and 
so violates the Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures. See U.S. Wants End to 
Farm Dispute, Fm. PoST, June 6, 1995, at 6. For further evidence that health-and-safety rules 
have been affected, see Thailand: Restrictions on Importation of and Internal Taxes on C/ga· 
rette [hereinafter Thailand Restriction,s on Importation], in GAIT, BASIC INSTRUMENTS AND 
SELECTED DOCUMENTS 200, 225-26 (37th Supp. 1991) [hereinafter BASIC INSTRUMENTS] 
(finding that Thailand's measures restricting the importation of cigarettes in the name of a 
national health policy were not "necessary" within the meaning of Article XX(b) of the 
GAIT). 
24. See Tina E. Levine, Assessment and Communication of Risks from Pesticide Residues 
in Food, 41 FooD & DRUG LJ. 207, 211 (1992) (noting that the State Department exerted 
considerable pressure on the EPA to establish tolerance levels more quickly); see also Patti 
Goldman, The Democratization of the Development of United States Trade Policy, 27 COR-
NELL INTL. LJ. 631, 638 n.24 (1994) (asserting that "it is not at all clear that the proposed 
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Third, the reach of trade law is often expanded, not through spe-
cific treaty language, but rather through a case-specific application 
of broad treaty prohibitions. For example, the WTO's general pro-
hibition against discrimination in trade can lead to far-reaching con-
sequences similar to those resulting from the expansive 
interpretation of the Dormant Commerce Clause and Article 30 of 
the Treaty of Rome.25 Though the adjudicators of a WTO dispute 
are not at liberty to employ the broad constitutional methods of 
interpretation applied to the U.S. Constitution and the Treaty of 
Rome, even more conservative modes of interpretation leave the 
WTO adjudicative process with a central role in expanding the hori-
zons of WTO law. 
The GATT ruling in the Thai Cigarettes case has advanced a 
potentially far-reaching formula for the scope of Article XX's ex-
ception to the general ban on discrimination, which allows discrimi-
nation if it is "necessary" to protect public interests such as health 
and the environment. The panel stated: 
[A] contracting party cannot justify a measure inconsistent with other 
GAIT provisions as "necessary" ... if an alternative measure which it 
could reasonably be expected to employ and which is not inconsistent 
with other GATT provisions is available to it. By the same token, in 
cases where a measure consistent with other GAIT provisions is not 
reasonably available, a contracting party is bound to use, among the 
measures reasonably available to it, that which entails the least degree 
of inconsistency with other GAIT provisions.26 
Under this formula, though it is the prerogative of national regula-
tors to set levels of health and environmental protection, they must 
achieve these levels by the least-trade-restrictive means - and it is 
the panel that makes this determination.27 
tolerance comports with the statutory standard of public health protection because EPA did 
not conduct its health assessment at the level of the proposed tolerance"). 
25. For a comparison of the Supreme Court's expansive interpretation of the Dormant 
Commerce Clause and the European Court of Justice's similar interpretation of Article 30 of 
the Treaty of Rome in the context of European economic integration, see Eruc STEIN & 
TERRANCE SANDALOW, On the Two Systems: An Overview, in 1 CoUR1S AND FREE MAR-
KETS: PERSPECTIVES FROM nm UNITED STATES AND EUROPE 3, 24-30 (1980). 
26. Thailand: Restrictions on Importation, supra note 23, at 223 (quoting United States: 
Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, in BASIC INSTRUMENTS, supra note 23, at 345, 392 (36th 
Supp. 1990)). 
27. The language of the Thai Cigarettes case is strikingly s_imilar to that employed by the 
European Court of Justice in limiting the scope of Article 36 of the Treaty of Rome, which is 
analogous to GATT Article XX. According to the Court of Justice, under Article 36, public-
health "measures are justified only if it is established that they are necessary in order to 
attain the objective of protection referred to in Article 36 and that such protection cannot be 
achieved by means which place less of a restriction on the free movement of goods within the 
Community." Case 155/82, Commission v. Belgium, 3 E.C.R. 531, 543 (1983). For the gen-
eral trend in the findings of GATT panels, see 1 Worun TRADE ORO., GUIDE TO GATT 
LAW AND PRACTICE: ANALYTICAL INDEX 151-55 (1994) (noting that GATT panels consist-
ently have expanded the scope of the national-treatment clause's ban on discrimination 
against foreign products, extending the notion of discrimination beyond facial discrimination 
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.B. The Role of the Dispute-Settlement Process 
As the preceding discussion suggests, the degree to which free-
trade commitments affect other domestic policies is determined in 
great part by the dispute-settlement process of the WTO. This pro-
cess is governed by the Understanding on Rules and Procedures 
Governing the Settlement of Disputes (DSU).28 Under the DSU, 
parties first must try to settle their dispute by negotiating.29 If they 
fail to resolve the dispute within sixty days, the complaining party 
may choose to submit the dispute to adjudication by a panel of 
experts.30 
When dispute settlement results in a negotiated settlement, the 
impact of WTO law on nontrade areas of policy is potentially 
greater than it is when disputes are adjudicated.31 As the Reformu-
lated Gasoline Case illustrates, countries whose laws allegedly vio-
late WTO law may have strategic reasons to settle even if they 
believe they may win an adjudicated case.32 Although the WTO 
provides a safeguard against negotiated settlements that undermine 
free trade,33 no similar safeguard exists to protect against the pres-
sure, inherent in the give and take of trade disputes, to dismantle 
domestic laws in an effort to reach an agreement.34 
to a notion of de facto discrimination including "unequal competitive opportunities"). The 
Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, supra note 20, 33 I.L.M. at 1381, sets a 
judicial standard that explicitly goes beyond facial nondiscrimination. 
28. Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, an-
nexed to WTO Agreement, supra note 4, 33 I.L.M. at 1226 [hereinafter Dispute Settlement 
Understanding]. . 
29. See id. 33 I.L.M. at 1229. 
30. See id. For a brief description and analysis of the DSU and its impact on international 
trade dispute settlement, see Andreas Lowenfeld, Remedies Along with Rights: Institutional 
Reform in the New GAIT, 88 AM. J. INTI.. L. 477 {1994). 
31. In the case of negotiated settlements, the source of legal obligation is not WfO law 
but rather the general international law commitment created by the agreement between the 
settling parties. To give rise to an international law obligation, the agreement need not be 
referred to as a treaty. See Weinberger v. Rossi, 456 U.S. 25, 29 n.5 {1982) (referring to 
Article 2 of the Vienna Convention as denying the importance of distinctions between trea-
ties and other international agreements). Oral commitments may even be binding as a mat-
ter of international law. See, e.g., Nuclear Test (N.Z. v. Fr.), 1974 I.CJ. 457, 472-74 {Dec. 20); 
Nuclear Test (Aust!. v. Fr.), 1974 I.C.J. 253, 269-71 (Dec. 20). 
32. For example, in the Reformulated Gasoline Case, see supra notes 1-9 and accompany-
ing text, the EPA noted that the terms of its settlement involved changing its rule with regard 
to reformulated gasoline only, whereas it felt the alternative of adjudication might lead to a 
finding that the EPA rule provisions on regular gasoline would have to be altered also. See 
EPA Announces, supra note 1, at 504. 
33. The terms of negotiated settlements must be reported to the WTO. See Dispute Set· 
tlement Understanding, supra note 28, art. 3(6), 33 I.L.M. at 1227. A requirement that these 
terms be consistent with WTO law, see id. art. 3(5), 33 I.L.M. at 1227, ensures that parties will 
not undermine the trade regime by settling on terms that are more trade-restrictive than 
those that would be imposed through adjudication. 
34. Naturally, no DSU provision prohibits settlements that undermine nontrade rules 
more than the trade regime requires. But the dynamics of negotiated settlements may create 
this result. The synergy between the hormone and procymidone disputes exemplifies the 
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In addition to generating far-reaching effects on domestic pol-
icy, the dispute-settlement process naturally produces results that 
favor free trade over other public-policy concerns.3s Although 
WTO rules contain exceptions designed to prevent undue en-
croachment on national governments, efforts to pursue legitimate 
nontrade policies,36 these exceptions require the country whose rule 
is at issue to prove its nondiscriminatory basis - a difficult 
burden.37 
Moreover, the international law that is designed to promote in-
terests other than free trade fails to offset the impact of 
international trade law. No worldwide mechanism approaching the 
level of efficacy of the WTO enforces countervailing international 
norms,38 and WTO law does not incorporate them by reference.39 
pressures that the free-trade rules may exert on domestic laws outside of any formal adjudi-
cation. The desire of the United States to press cases such as the one against the European 
Union ban on hormones in beef production created pressure on the EPA to establish hastily 
procymidone-tolerance levels since any appearance of protectionism on the part of the 
United States would undermine its position with regard to the European Union. See supra 
note 24 and accompanying text 
35. For more on this imbalance - called "trade bias" by environmentalists - see Patti 
A. Goldman, Resolving the Trade and Environment Debate: In Search of a Neutral Forum 
and Neutral Principles, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1279, 1289-96 (1992) (arguing that GATI 
trade rules - developed at a time when international economic matters were not associated 
with health and environmental considerations - fail to account for environmental externali-
ties and thwart needed domestic legislation, as well as unilateral efforts to force higher envi-
ronmental standards worldwide). 
36. When a national provision is found to discriminate against or among foreign goods, 
that provision may be justified as "necessary" under GATI Article XX, which states: 
Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner which would 
constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where 
the same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on international trade, nothing in 
this Agreement shall be construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement by any con-
tracting party of measures [necessary to protect environment, human health, etc]. 
GATI, supra note 4, 61 Stat at AGO, 55 U.N.T.S. at 262. 
37. See United States: Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, in BASIC INSTRUMENTS, supra note 
23, at 155, 197 (39th Supp. 1993) ("[T]he practice of panels has been to interpret Article XX 
narrowly, to place the burden on the party invoking Article XX to justify its invocation, and 
not to examine Article XX exceptions unless invoked." (footnotes omitted)). 
38. See, e.g., Jeffrey L. Dunoff, Institutional Misfits: The GAIT, The !CJ and Trade-
Environment Disputes, 15 MICH. J. INTI.. L. 1043, 1046 (1994) (concluding, after surveying 
studies of the relevant international institutions, that "nations have been reluctant to use 
international tribunals in the past, and the advocates of adjudication offer little reason to 
think that global environmental disputes will find their way to international courts more fre-
quently in the future"). 
39. Although the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) contains a clause 
stating that international environmental protection agreements trump NAFTA provisions, 
the GATI offers no such general deference to environmental norms. See North American 
Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, Can.-Mex.-U.S., art. 104, 32 I.L.M. 289, 297-98 ("In 
the event of any inconsistency between this Agreement and the specific trade obligations set 
out in [certain major environmental conventions as well as the agreements listed in Annex 
104.1 of the NAFTA], such obligations shall prevail to the extent of the inconsistency .... "). 
For a more modest but similar approach to the GATI, see John H. Jackson, World Trade 
Rules and Environmental Policies: Congruence or Conflict?, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1227, 
1271 (1992) (suggesting that, without amending the GATI treaty, countries could waive each 
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Thus, when international law prevails over national law, the world-
trading system, unimpaired by other international forces or its own 
terms, may run roughshod over the many policies it affects but is 
not designed to promote. 
II. THE LOOPHOLE IN CONGRESS'S ATIEMPT To CONTROL THE 
IMPACT OF THE WORLD-TRADING SYSTEM ON 
DOMESTIC POLICY 
Concerns over the impact of the world-trading system on do-
mestic policy pervaded the congressional debates over U.S. acces-
sion to the WT0.40 In the statute implementing the WTO, the 
URAA, Congress established a scheme designed to assert political 
control over the United States' interaction with the WT0.41 Sec-
tion II.A points out that the URAA's provisions enable Congress 
to control the Executive Branch's role in settling trade disputes 
through adjudication but fail to control the Executive when it nego-
tiates settlements as an alternative to adjudication. Section II.B as-
serts that this loophole is of particular concern in cases when the 
Executive Branch negotiates settlements it can implement on its 
own authority. 
A. URAA Inapplicability to Negotiated Settlements 
The URAA contains elaborate provisions to control the Execu-
tive Branch when it represents the United States in dispute-
settlement proceedings before the WT0.42 The URAA establishes 
information and consultation requirements designed to keep Con-
gress, various quasi-representative bodies, and the public informed 
about the Executive Branch's participation in WTO activities. One. 
set of provisions is designed to give the general public access to 
information about adjudicative proceedings by requiring that they 
be as transparent as possible within the constraints of WTO rules.43 
other's GATI obligations, allowing them to apply standards prescribed in certain specified 
international environmental agreements though this otherwise would result in a GATI 
violation). 
40. See, e.g., H.R. Con. Res. 246, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1992) (expressing the "sense of 
Congress" that trade agreements negotiated in the Uruguay Round must be compatible with 
U.S. health, safety, labor, and environmental laws). 
41. See Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, § 127, 108 Stat. 4809, 
4835-36 (1994). 
42. For a brief explanation of WTO dispute-settlement proceedings, see supra notes 28-
30 and accompanying text. 
43. Recognizing that WTO rules governing disclosure are at present too restrictive, Con-
gress in the URAA exhorted the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) to "seek [within the 
WTO] adoption ..• of procedures that will ensure broader application of the principle of 
transparency .•• through the observance of open ••. procedures." Uruguay Round Agree-
ments Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, § 126, 108 Stat 4809, 4834 (1994). The USTR must give 
notice of the existence of panel proceedings and the issues involved. When the United States 
or its adversary in a dispute requests that the case be brought before a panel, the USTR must 
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Another set of URAA provisions establishes procedures designed 
to subject the Executive Branch's interaction with the WTO during 
adjudication to oversight44 by congressional committees and quasi-
representative bodies.45 A third set of provisions applies similar 
oversight provisions to the regulatory implementation of WTO 
rulings.46 
Extensive though they are, none of the URAA's oversight and 
transparency provisions applies to negotiated settlements because 
those provisions apply only after a complainant requests that a dis-
pute be brought before a panel.47 This is a substantial omission, 
publish a notice in the Federal Register setting forth the major issues raised by the complain-
ant and indicating what, if any, state or federal law is at issue. See Uruguay Round Agree-
ments Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, § 127(b), 108 Stat. 4809, 4835 (1994). Promptly after a 
dispute-settlement panel is established in a case alleging an inconsistency of federal or state 
law with WTO law, the USTR must notify the "appropriate Congressional committees" of 
the nature of the dispute, the composition of the panel, and whether the members of the 
panel were appointed by consensus. See Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-
465, § 123( d), 108 Stat. 4809, 4831 (1994). Also, the submissions of the parties and the find-
ings of the panel must be made available to the public to the extent disclosure is permitted by 
WTO rules. The USTR's written submissions must be made available to the public promptly 
after they are presented to the panel. As to other parties' submissions, the USTR must 
request each other party to allow the USTR to make them available to the public. If permis-
sion is refused, then the USTR must request the nonconfidential summary that parties to a 
WTO dispute are required under the Understanding to provide on request. See Uruguay 
Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, § 127(d), 108 Stat. 4809, 4835 (1994). Panel 
decisions must be made available to the public promptly after their adoption. See Uruguay 
Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, § 127(c), 108 Stat. 4809, 4835 (1994). 
44. For a description of this oversight mechanism, see infra section III.B.1. 
45. For the composition of these representative bodies, see infra note 69 and accompany-
ing text. 
46. Section 135 of the Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. § 2155 (1994), contains oversight 
provisions, applicable to WTO negotiated settlements, that are roughly analogous to some of 
the URAA provisions governing WTO adjudicated settlements. For a description of the 
oversight provisions of the Trade Act of 1974 and their shortcomings, see infra note 84 and 
accompanying text. For a description of the URAA's oversight provisions analogous to 
those of § 135 of the Trade Act of 1974, see infra section III.B. 
47. The provisions apply when the United States is involved in proceedings before a 
panel See Uruguay Round Agreements Act~ Pub. L. No. 103-465, § 127(a), 108 Stat. 4809, 
4835 (1994); see also Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, § 123(d), 108 
Stat. 4809, 4830 (1994) (requiring the USTR to consult congressional committees "[p]romptly 
after a dispute settlement panel is established"). 
A different series of consultation provisions applies from the time negotiations begin 
when state law is concerned. These are part of a set of provisions entitled "Federal-State 
Cooperation." See Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, § 102(b)(l)(C), 
108 Stat. 4809, 4816 (1994). These provisions require the USTR to consult with state govern-
ments during trade disputes when state laws are at issue. See Uruguay Round Agreements 
Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, § 102(b)(l)(C)(i), 108 Stat. 4809, 4816 (1994). Unlike the analo-
gous provisions requiring consultations at the federal level, the state consultation provisions 
cover the negotiations as well as the adjudicative phase in WTO dispute settlement. See 
Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, § 102(b)(l)(C)(i), 108 Stat. 4809, 
4816 (1994). However, the USTR is to consult only with the members of the executive 
branch of the state government. See Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No.103-465, 
§ 102(b)(l)(C)(i), 108 Stat. 4809, 4816 (1994). Thus, these provisions do not ensure demo-
cratic control in the manner of the provisions applying to adjudicated settlements. 
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given that many disputes are likely to end in a negotiated settle-
ment before either party requests a panel hearing.4s 
Congress's failure to cover negotiated settlements under the 
URAA is difficult to justify. As noted in Part I, the impact of WTO 
law on U.S. domestic law is potentially even greater when it results 
from negotiated, as opposed to adjudicated, settlements.49 The dif-
ference in treatment of negotiated and adjudicated settlements may 
derive some justification from the fact that Congress is more likely 
to refuse to implement a negotiated settlement than an adjudicated 
settlement. Even though both WTO adjudicative rulings and nego-
tiated settlements create international law obligations, a WTO rul-
ing is likely to carry greater moral force than a negotiated 
settlement.50 Thus, in the case of negotiated settlements, Congress 
may be more inclined to implement a negotiated settlement, acting 
as a democratic buffer between the international process and its im-
pact on domestic law. Congress's inclination to refuse to imple-
ment settlements, however, will always be tempered by concern for 
the United States' credibility in future negotiations, and this con-
cern often will stand in the way of Congress's ability to act as a 
democratic buffer. 
B. Executive-Implemented Settlements 
Though this discussion thus far has assumed that implementing 
a negotiated settlement would require the intervention of Congress, 
those settlements calling for regulatory - rather than statutory -
changes would not require congressional intervention. The Refor-
mulated Gasoline Case discussed in the Introduction is a good ex-
ample. This section argues that the current law offers virtually no 
democratic control over the Executive Branch when it negotiates 
settlements and implements them using its regulatory authority. 
Section II.B.1 notes that congressional control is insubstantial, and 
48. If a silent legislative history is any indication, Congress did not consider the discrep-
ancy between its treatment of adjudicated and negotiated settlements. See, e.g., H.R. Doc. 
No. 316, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. 656, 656-57 (1994), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4040, 4040· 
41 (Statement of Administrative Action) (discussing URAA provisions for consultations re-
garding adjudicated settlements and making no reference to negotiated settlements); H.R. 
REP. No. 826(1), 103d Cong., 2d Sess. 32-33 (1994), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3773, 
3804-05 (same). 
49. The strategic incentives that come into play during negotiations can lead to modifica· 
tions of U.S. law not required by WTO law. See supra notes 31-34 and accompanying text. 
50. Whereas a negotiated settlement expresses only the terms of an ad hoc arrangement 
between the parties giving rise to an international law obligation, a panel ruling is an authori-
tative statement of WTO law. Disrespecting a panel ruling would call into question the au-
thority of WTO law itself and the institutional authority of the WTO embodied by the panel. 
This would undermine the WTO dispute-settlement system. The United States, which has 
used the GAIT dispute settlement to its benefit more than any other trading partner, cannot 
afford to undermine the WTO system. See, e.g., Gary Horlick, Dispute Resolution Mecha-
nism: Will the United States Play by the Rules?, J. WORLD TRADE, Apr. 1995, at 163. 
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section II.B.2 asserts that alternatives to congressional control are 
inadequate. 
1. A Near Absence of Congressional Control 
Congress can control executive regulatory action by using the 
power of the purse or passing a law to reverse a particular line of 
regulatory conduct. But there are two factors militating against 
congressional control by such means. First, concern for the credi-
bility of the United States as a contracting party weighs against re-
versing a policy the Executive Branch has developed in conjunction 
with a trading partner. Second, Congress's role in this context de-
pends on its willingness to intervene actively. This is quite different 
from its role when a settlement requires statutory changes. In the 
latter case, Congress can control the impact of WTO law merely by 
refusing to modify laws to comply with the agreement. Congres-
sional control over the WTO's impact on regulatory policy, on the 
other hand, supposes aggressive congressional intervention in fields 
where Congress has abandoned day-to-day control. This occurred 
in the Reformulated Gasoline Case. But few would expect Con-
gress to intervene every time international negotiations led to rule 
changes. Indeed, many regulatory issues will simply escape the at-
tention of Congress. 
2. The Inadequacy of the Normal Alternatives to Congressional 
Control 
Administrative law provides other procedures for ensuring the 
democratic integrity of the rules it produces, precisely because most 
regulatory activity will not draw the attention of Congress. Agen-
cies normally create, modify, or rescind rules following procedures 
guaranteeing public participation, which are set out in the Adminis-
trative Procedure Act (APA).51 These procedures generally involve 
a period of public notice and comment.52 Agencies, however, may 
dispense with those procedures under a foreign-affairs exception 
applicable when rulemaking is pursuant to an international 
agreement.53 
51. Administrative Procedure Act, Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237 {1946) (codified as 
amended at 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-59, 701-06, 3105, 3344 {1994)). 
52. The most common type of rulemaking, informal rulemaking, follows a three-step pro-
cess. First, notice of the proposed rule must be published in the Federal Register. See 5 
U.S.C. § 553(b) {1994). Second, interested persons must be allowed to submit their views on 
the proposed rule. See 5 U.S.C. § 553{c) {1994). Third, the agency adopting the rule must 
create a general statement of the rule's basis and purpose. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) {1994). 
53. See supra note 17. 
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Even if an agency waives the foreign-affairs exception to the 
APA,54 the international negotiations giving rise to the rule change 
will tend to undermine the significance of the public-notice-and-
comment process. Before submitting the necessary rule changes to 
public notice and comment, the agency must have reached at least a 
tentative agreement with another country.55 At this point, the 
agency has a number of incentives to ignore legitimate domestic 
interests unless they can be accommodated without altering the 
terms of the tentative agreement. First, the agency and the foreign 
power often will have expended great efforts to reach a delicately 
balanced solution, and thus the parties naturally will be disinclined 
to return to the negotiating table to work out a new solution. Sec-
ond, the agency generally will prefer to implement an agreement as 
negotiated to avoid losing credibility in future negotiations. The 
fact that the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) always leads U.S. 
negotiating teams56 in trade matters makes the concern about fu-
ture negotiating clout even more pressing. Third, the leading role 
of the USTR creates an institutional bias in favor of promoting free 
trade and against concerns specific to the domestic regulatory field 
involved that militate in favor of renegotiating. 
III. CLOSING THE LOOPHOLE 
The erosion of democracy resulting from the Executive Branch's 
dual role as advocate for the United States in WTO negotiated set-
tlements and domestic lawmaker presents a dilemma. International 
negotiations require that the United States speak with one voice. 
The particular context of dispute resolution also often requires se-
crecy .57 But although secrecy is an effective way to strike a deal in 
an individual case involving international law, it is an unsatisfactory 
way to make domestic policy. The challenge is thus to balance the 
conflicting imperatives of the international and domestic systems in 
which the Executive Branch simultaneously must operate. 
54. Agencies do not always invoke the foreign-affairs exception when issuing rule 
changes pursuant to an international agreement. One such instance was the EPA's notice for 
public comment on its final rule implementing the Montreal Protocol on Substances that 
Deplete the Ozone Layer. See Protection of Stratospheric Ozone, 53 Fed. Reg. 30,566 
(1988). 
55. Under an even less ideal scenario, the agency formally might conclude the agreement 
before submitting the necessary rule changes for public notice and comment. Under these 
circumstances, the only role of the notice-and-comment process would be to aid the agency in 
choosing among any regulatory options left open by the agreement. 
56. See 19 U.S.C. § 2171(c)(l)(C) (1994). 
57. If negotiators must work in public, the political concerns of both sides will lead to 
posturing, thus obstructing the path to a mutually agreeable solution. In the particular in-
stance of negotiated settlements within the WTO, the governing rules require that negotia-
tions be confidential. See infra note 61 and accompanying text. 
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This Part contends that a balanced solution lies in a formal 
mechanism subjecting the Executive Branch to timely political 
oversight that allows it to operate independently and, when appro-
priate, under conditions of secrecy. Section III.A explains the four 
attributes that such a solution should seek to achieve. Section III.B 
points out that the URAA's scheme for political oversight of the 
Executive Branch's role in connection with WTO adjudicated set-
tlements suggests a scheme well-suited to achieve similar oversight 
of the Executive's role in connection with negotiated settlements. 
Section III.C proposes enacting such a scheme through two minor 
amendments. One amendment would alter the Trade Act of 1974 
to make advisory committee meetings under that Act mandatory 
during negotiated settlements. This amendment also would trigger 
an existing provision of that Act requiring consultations with con-
gressional advisors. Another amendment would alter the DRAA 
itself and extend its procedures that now only govern agency action 
pursuant to a WTO adjudicated settlement to agency action pursu-
ant to a negotiated settlement. 
A. The Parameters of a Solution 
Four general policies should guide a solution in order to accom-
modate the conflicting exigencies of diplomacy and domestic poli-
cymaking: (1) control over the President should result from 
increased political scrutiny, not binding congressional or judicial 
control; (2) any means of increasing political scrutiny should accom-
modate the occasional need for secrecy in international negotia-
tions; (3) political scrutiny should be timely; and (4) it should be 
ensured through procedural requirements. This section briefly de-
scribes the importance of each of these policy goals. 
1. Political Scrutiny 
An oversight mechanism should achieve democratic control, not 
by limiting the ultimate authority of the President, but rather by 
subjecting the exercise of that authority to political scrutiny. The 
binding control of Congress is not necessary to achieve policies re-
sponsive to the public because, as many advocates of executive-
branch preeminence in foreign affairs will point out, the President 
was elected too.58 Further, sharing power with Congress in this 
context is not only unnecessary but undesirable. Congressional 
decisionmaking in the area of international trade leads to the preva-
58. An even stronger view has been expressed by Professor Trimble. 
[I]t is at least unclear why Congress, especially its Senate half, should be considered 
more "democratic" than the President. Each institution - House, Senate, President -
has its own electoral cycle and its distinctive constituencies. The House is elected more 
frequently, and thus is presumably more susceptible to the immediate moods of its con-
stituencies. But only the President has the entire people as his constituency. 
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lence of parochial concerns over broader national interests.s9 Judi-
cial control by means of adjudicating private suits seeking review of 
negotiated settlements almost certainly would engender the undue 
influence of special interests.60 
2. A Selective Approach to Secrecy 
Although negotiations sometimes must take place under condi-
tions of secrecy, the domestic rulemaking process connected with 
negotiations need not. The WTO's DSU requires the confidential-
ity of negotiations held within the framework of that Understand-
ing. 61 But domestic rulemaking pursuant to the resolution of a 
dispute within the WTO need not62 and should not63 take place 
outside the normal procedures ensuring public input. 
3. Timing 
When regulatory policy is tributary to international agreements, 
the timing of political scrutiny is crucial. Domestic political forces 
should weigh in before these agreements are concluded. Once an 
agreement is in place, those in charge of implementing the agree-
ment are faced with the choice of either ignoring domestic resist-
ance to the policy changes dictated by the agreement or reneging on 
Phillip R. Trimble, The President's Constitutional Authority to Use Limited Military Force, 89 
AM. J. INTI.. L. 84, fr7 {1995). Trimble goes on to argue that sole presidential authority at 
times may serve democracy better than shared power: 
One of the hallmarks of democracy is accountability. The Haiti experience dramatically 
demonstrates the accountable, and hence quintessentially democratic, nature of the 
presidency. The President and his advisers have discussed the Haiti situation in news 
conferences, radio addresses, press releases and innumerable other interactions with in-
terested constituencies. Most importantly, Haiti seems quite likely to figure in the Presi-
dent's campaign for reelection (as it did in his 1992 campaign). 
No member of Congress, on the other hand, has addressed anyone on the congres-
sional position (there really is none). No member of Congress will be asked to account 
for that institution's votes, or failures to vote, on Haiti. To be sure, a member of Con-
gress may be attacked for a particular vote, or for being too "inside the Beltway" or 
otherwise identified with Washington, but Congress as a whole is never accountable to 
any constituency, let alone the American people as a whole. 
Id. 
59. See l.M. DESTI.ER, AMERICAN TRADE POLITICS 4-8 {1995) (explaining that protec-
tionist interests tend to be concentrated and free-trade interests tend to be diffused and that 
members of Congress - who must respond to concentrated interests - are thus under great 
pressure to vote for protectionist policies and asserting that this was a major factor prompt· 
ing Congress to delegate much trade-policymaking authority to the President, who is better 
equipped to ignore concentrated interests in favor of the general interest). 
60. See, e.g., Alan 0. Sykes, Constructive Unilateral Threats in International Commercial 
Relations: The Limited Case for Section 30I, 23 LAW & POLY. INTI.. Bus. 263, 317 (demon-
strating that § 301, which operates under the highly discretionary control of the USTR, has 
not been "captured" by private interests to assert a protectionist policy, as opposed to other 
trade statutes that provide for a great number of judicially enforceable private rights). 
61. See Dispute Settlement Understanding, supra note 28, art. 4(6), 33 I.L.M. at 1229. 
62. See infra section III.B.2. 
63. See infra section III.C.2. 
March 1996] Note - World Trade Organization 1283 
the agreement. It is preferable to avoid this dilemma by engaging 
in as much domestic political discussion as possible before the 
agreement is finalized.64 
4. The Need for Formal Procedures 
Although political scrutiny often will occur spontaneously, the 
force and pervasiveness of the WTO's influence over U.S. policy 
call for an institutional response to ensure timely, consistent polit-
ical scrutiny. In the Reformulated Gasoline Case, the EPA did pro-
vide opportunity for public notice and comment - after the 
impending deal with Venezuela was leaked - before closing the 
deal with Venezuela.65 But the EPA and other agencies do not 
have to submit rulemaking that is pursuant to internationally nego-
tiated agreements to public notice and comment, and they have 
used this loophole on at least one important occasion.66 As argued 
in Part II, many regulatory changes may not elicit a congressio:Q.al 
response. Yet public influence over executive policies should not 
depend on the level of congressional interest. For example, though 
Congress may not be moved to combat higher-than-optimal toler-
ance levels for procymidone,67 the public ought to have some input 
into the decision whether to pay the price of such a policy for the 
sake of increasing free trade. If, however, the Executive Branch is 
permitted to alter trade-related domestic policy by presenting the 
public with a series of faits accomplis, negotiated settlements are 
likely steadily to erode nontrade domestic policies. It is not enough 
to assume that the Executive Branch will react to public disap-
proval of the general trend in policy. The trend will be too gradual 
to provoke a sharp reaction. Thus, political scrutiny should operate 
through some institutional device that puts the spotlight on each 
incremental step the Executive takes to adapt U.S. rules to the re-
quirements of the international trade regime. 
64. If domestic political forces can weigh in before the conclusion of an agreement, the 
result is likely to be an agreement more reflective of the interests concerned. In the event 
that domestic resistance precludes any negotiated settlement, the ensuing adjudication will 
force only the undesired policy change if this is required by WTO law. 
65. See EPA Announces, supra note 1, at 504. 
66. On November 21, 1991, the Federal Highway Administration (FHA) entered into a 
memorandum of understanding with Mexico involving the mutual recognition of commercial 
drivers' licenses. The FHA later promulgated a rule implementing the agreement, see 51 
Fed. Reg. 31,454 (1992), without, however, following the APA's public-notice-and-comment 
procedures. See International Bhd. of Teamsters v. Pefia, 17 F.3d 1478, 1486 (D.C. Cir. 1994). 
For an account of the events surrounding that case, see Goldman, supra note 24, at 653. 
67. See supra notes 23-24 and accompanying text. 
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B. The URAA's Formal-Oversight Requirements 
The URAA procedures governing adjudicated settlements offer 
good models for developing procedures to guarantee political con-
trol over the President in negotiated settlements. These procedures 
achieve the policy goals described in the previous section. Section 
ill.B.1 examines the URAA's use of congressional and private-
sector advisory committees to oversee the Executive Branch as it 
participates in adjudicated settlements. Section III.B.2 examines 
the URAA procedures governing agency action pursuant to adjudi-
cated settlements. 
1. Political Control During Negotiations 
Whenever the United States is a party in WTO adjudicative pro-
ceedings, the URAA requires the USTR to consult representative 
bodies "at each stage of the proceeding[s]."68 These bodies include 
"advisory committees," representing a cross-section of the private 
sector, as well as representatives of state and local governments.69 
The USTR also must consult congressional committees according 
to the same schedule.10 The congressional committees to be con-
68. Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, § 127(a), 108 Stat. 4809, 4835 
(1994). The URAA contains other provisions, not directly relevant to this Note, that also are 
designed to assert democratic control over the United States' interaction with the \VfO. 
Certain provisions designed to give the public access to the adjudicative proceedings before 
the wro would not be adapted easily to negotiations because the terms of the wro require 
that dispute-settlement negotiations be confidential. See Dispute Settlement Understanding, 
supra note 28, art. 4(6), 33 I.L.M. at 1229. For an argument in favor of transparency in 
negotiated settlements under the pre-WTO regime of GATI's dispute-settlement mecha-
nism, see Naomi Robt-Arriaza, Precaution, Participation, and the "Greening" of International 
Trade Law, 7 J. ENVrL. L. & Lmo. 57, 96-98 (1992). In addition to the devices designed to 
ensure political oversight of the President's role of representing the United States in \VfO 
dispute-settlement proceedings, the URAA contains similar provisions with respect to deci-
sionmaking in the \VfO. These mainly require consulting congressional committees before 
"any vote is taken by the Ministerial Conference or the General Council" of the \VfO and 
systematically reporting to Congress on any decisions taken. Uruguay Round Agreements 
Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, § 122, 108 Stat. 4809, 4829-30 (1994). More general requirements 
involve a yearly report to Congress on participation in the \VfO, see Uruguay Round Agree-
ments Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, § 124, 108 Stat. 4809, 4832-33 (1994), and a more general 
assessment of participation in the \VfO to be submitted to Congress every five years, see 
Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, § 125, 108 Stat. 4809, 4833-34 (1994). 
69. The advisory committees are made up of various representatives of industry, labor, 
environmental, and consumer interests, as well as state and local government. See Uruguay 
Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, § 127(a), 108 Stat. 4809, 4835 (1994). For a 
general discussion of the history of advisory committees and their relations to the President 
and Congress, see Jay S. Bybee, Advising the President: Separation of Powers and the Federal 
Advisory Committee Act, 104 YALE LJ. 51 (1994). For criticism of the insufficient breadth of 
interests represented on advisory committees, see infra note 81. 
70. See Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, § 127(a), 108 Stat. 4809, 
4835 (1994). Congressional committees also are consulted as to the identity of the experts 
appointed to serve on an ad hoc basis as members of the panels that function as \VfO courts 
of first instance, including: whether those persons were appointed by the normal rule of 
consensus, see Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, § 123(d), 108 Stat. 
4809, 4830-31 (1994); with respect to any panel report, the nature of any appeal that may be 
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sulted include the Senate Finance Committee, the House Ways and 
· Means Committee, and any other congressional committees having 
jurisdiction over the matter under consultation.11 
This set of provisions subjects the negotiating process to acute 
political scrutiny, yet it provides the Executive Branch with suffi-
cient flexibility in negotiations. The Executive Branch is not bound 
by the advice it receives. 72 The URAA provisions also allow for 
secrecy when necessary. Although the URAA does not require the 
confidentiality of communications to the congressional committees, 
confidentiality can be secured through an injunction of secrecy.13 
The USTR also may consult the advisory committees confidentially 
if need be.74 As to timing, by requiring consultation during the pro-
ceedings, the URAA enables the congressional and advisory com-
mittees to influence the USTR while it is still in a position to affect 
the course of WTO proceedings, not afterwards. 
2. Political Control Over Agency Regulatory Action 
If WTO adjudication results in a finding that a U.S. agency's 
regulation or practice is inconsistent with WTO law, the DRAA 
provides for political scrutiny of the Executive Branch's efforts to 
taken, see Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, § 123(f)(2), 108 Stat. 4809, 
4831 (1994); the issues raised on any appeal and the identity of the persons serving on the 
appellate body, see Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, § 123( e), 108 Stat. 
4809, 4831 (1994); in the case of an adverse panel report, "whether to implement the report's 
recommendation and, if so, the manner of such implementation and the period of time 
needed for such implementation." Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, 
§ 123(f)(3), 108 Stat. 4809, 4831 (1994). 
71. The URAA refers to "appropriate congressional committees," defined as the House 
Committee on Ways and Means and the Senate Committee on Finance, see Uruguay Round 
Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, § 121(3)(B), 108 Stat. 4809, 4829 (1994), and "any 
other committees of Congress that have jurisdiction involving the matter with respect to 
which consultations are to be held." Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, 
§ 121(3)(A), 108 Stat. 4809, 4828 (1994). . 
72. This statement is nowhere explicitly made in the URAA, but it is implicit in the use of 
the term "consult." See Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, § 123(g), 108 
Stat. 4809, 4831-32 (1994) (permitting the House Ways and Means Committee and the Senate 
Finance Committee to "vote to indicate the[ir] agreement or disagreement" with final rules 
adopted by agencies pursuant to a panel ruling but specifying that the vote is not binding on 
the USTR.). 
73. For an example of a statute providing for similar confidential communications be-
tween the President and Congress, see 1 U.S.C. § 112b(a) (1994) (requiring that the President 
transmit to Congress any international agreement, other than a treaty, to which the United 
States is a party, but that, when disclosure of the agreement would "in the opinion of the 
President, be prejudicial to the national security of the United States," the agreement "shall 
be transmitted to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on 
Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives under an appropriate injunction of secrecy 
to be removed only upon due notice from the President"). 
74. The advisory committees referred to in the URAA are those generally governed by 
§ 135 of the Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. § 2155 (1994). See Uruguay Round Agreements 
Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, §§ 123(g)(l)(B), 127(a), 108 Stat. 4809, 4831, 4835 (1994). Section 
135 of the Trade Act authorizes nonpublic consultations with the advisory committees when 
necessary to maintain the integrity of trade negotiations. See 19 U.S.C. § 2155(f) (1994). 
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bring the regulation or practice into compliance with WTO law.1s 
Before modifying any regulation or practice, the relevant agency or 
department must seek advice from the advisory committees, consult 
the appropriate congressional committees, submit to the congres-
sional committees a report explaining and justifying the proposed 
rule or practice modifications, accompanied by a summary of the 
advice obtained from the advisory committees, and engage the 
public by providing notice and opportunity for public comment.76 
The USTR and the head of the relevant department or agency must 
have consulted the appropriate congressional committees on the 
proposed final rule or other modification sixty days before the 
change goes into effect.77 The Senate Finance Committee or the 
House Ways and Means Committee may cast a nonbinding7s "vote 
to indicate the agreement or disagreement of the committee with 
the proposed contents of the final rule or other modification. "79 
This set of provisions unleashes the full range of political scru-
tiny, calling on, not only the input and influence of congressional 
and advisory committees, but also public participation. The cir-
cumstances of agency rulemaking, as opposed to those of the inter-
national negotiating process, allow for this more extensive 
democratic control. Th.is· is because rulemaking intervenes after 
WTO adjudicative proceedings have run their course, as the agency 
takes action to implement the settlement. At that point, there is no 
need for secrecy. 
The existence of a public-notice-and-comment component in the 
provisions described above indicates that, where the WTO was con-
cerned, Congress felt the need to make an exception to the APA's 
75. This requirement is triggered "[i]n any case in which a dispute settlement panel or the 
Appellate Body finds in its report that a regulation or practice of a department or agency of 
the United States is inconsistent with any of the Uruguay Round Agreements." Uruguay 
Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, § 123(g)(l), 108 Stat. 4809, 4831 (1994). 
76. The URAA provides that a regulation may not be changed unless: 
(A) the appropriate congressional committees have been consulted .•. 
(B) the Trade Representative has sought advice ... from relevant private sector 
committees ..• 
(C) the head of the relevant department or agency has provided an opportunity for 
public comment by publishing in the Federal Register the proposed modification and an 
explanation for the modification; 
(D) the Trade Representative has submitted to the appropriate congressional com-
mittees a report describing the proposed modification, the reasons for the modification, 
and a summary of the advice obtained [from the advisory committees]. 
Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, § 123(g)(l), 108 Stat. 4809, 4831 
(1994). 
77. See Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, § 123(g)(2), 108 Stat. 
4809, 4832 (1994). 
78. The vote is not binding on the relevant department or agency. See Uruguay Round 
Agreements Act, Pub. L No. 103-465, § 123(g)(3), 108 Stat. 4809, 4832 (1994). 
79. Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, § 123(g)(3), 108 Stat. 4809, 
4832 {1994). 
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foreign-affairs exception.80 Indeed, the DRAA establishes proce-
dures more elaborate than those required by the APA inasmuch as 
the DRAA requires the consultation of Congress and advisory 
committees. 
C. The Mechanics of a Solution 
The preceding URAA provisions merited consideration not 
only by way of example but also because they suggest the current 
inclinations of Congress about how to achieve democratic control 
over the Executive Branch in the context of the WTO. This section 
suggests some minor reforms that would expand upon the work 
Congress began with the DRAA in 1994. Section III.C.l proposes 
amending the Trade Act of 1974 to require advisory committees to 
convene during the negotiation of settlements. Section III.C.2 pro-
poses amending the URAA itself. This amendment would extend 
to agency rulemaking pursuant to negotiated settlements the 
DRAA provisions currently governing agency rulemaking follow-
ing adjudicated settlements. In combination, these amendments 
would ensure that important domestic concerns are not ignored in 
the process of reaching international trade agreements. 
1. Amending the Trade Act of 1974 
Section 135 of the Trade Act of 1974 already offers most of the 
components of a device to ensure political scrutiny during negotia-
tions.s1 Section 135 requires the President to seek information and 
advice from advisory committees on matters relating to U.S. trade 
policy, including the development of negotiating positions.82 The 
80. On the APA's foreign-affairs exception, see supra note ~7. 
81. See 19 U.S.C. § 2155 (1994). Section 135 was introduced at the insistence of industry 
representatives concerned about being kept in the dark during the Tokyo Round trade nego-
tiations in the 1970s. See John H. Jackson et al., Implementing the Tokyo Round: Legal 
Aspects of Changing Economic Rules, 81 MICH. L. REv. 267, 352 (1982). Originally, the 
advisory committees were to represent "non-Federal governments, labor, industry, agricul-
ture, small business, service industries, retailers, and consumer interests." 19 U.S.C. 
§ 2155(b) (1988). During the Uruguay Round trade negotiations, however, the public and 
members of Congress voiced concern that these committees were being dominated by indus-
try. See Goldman, supra note 24, at 673. In response, the DRAA has added "nongovern-
mental environmental and conservation organizations" to the list of interests to be 
represented in § 135 advisory committees. See Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 
103-465, § 128, 108 Stat. 4809, 4836 (1994). Some still argue that advisory committees inade-
quately represent the range of interests affected by international trade law. See Goldman, 
supra note 24, at 672-77 (arguing that the membership of advisory committees is made up 
almost exclusively of representatives of industry, that nonindustry representatives are picked 
only from the trade-friendly ranks of consumer environmental and labor movements, and 
that this skewed representation violates the Federal Advisory Committee Act's balanced-
viewpoint requirement). 
82. See 19 U.S.C. § 2155(a)(l)(C) (1994). Under § 135, the USTR must: 
seek information and advice from representative elements of the private sector and the 
non-Federal governmental sector with respect to-
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advisory committees set up to operate under section 135 are the 
same as those referred to in the URAA, and the same provisions 
ensuring the confidentiality of consultations apply.83 
The timing provision of sectio~ 135 could be improved, how-
ever, because it does not require the USTR to convene advisory 
committees during negotiations. Although section 135 appears to 
mandate that the USTR consult advisors individually before and 
during negotiations when feasible, that provision does not impose 
requirements as to the timing of advisory committee meetings,84 
The required timely consultation of advisors on an individual basis 
is laudable, but a similar requirement as to the timing of advisory 
committee meetings would improve upon the existing consultation 
mechanism for a number of reasons. First, a requirement to consult 
advisors independently amounts only to ensuring that lobbying is 
more equitable and timely and that the government is better in-
formed. Convening advisors, on the other hand, would create a 
political forum that intensifies the Executive Branch's accountabil-
ity for the course of action it chooses. Advisors would hear the 
concerns other domestic constituencies have expressed and thus see 
clearly which interests weighed more heavily in the Executive's 
choices. The proposed system of confidential consultations thus 
provides a rough surrogate for public scrutiny as a means of ensur-
ing the political accountability of the Executive Branch without 
compromising secrecy.ss 
(A) negotiating objectives and bargaining positions before entering into a trade 
agreement ... 
(B) the operation of any trade agreement once entered into, including preparation 
for dispute settlement panel proceedings to which the United States is a party; and 
(C) other matters arising in connection with the development, implementation, and 
administration of the trade policy of the United States .••. 
To the maximum extent feasible, such information and advice on negotiating objectives 
shall be sought and considered before the commencement of negotiations. 
19 U.S.C. § 2155(a)(l)(C) (1994). 
83. See supra note 74. 
84. Although the URAA consultation provisions may trigger an obligation on the part of 
the USTR to consult advisory committee members individually during negotiations, those 
provisions do not trigger an obligation to convene advisory committee meetings. The amend· 
ing history of § 135 suggests that the Executive is not obligated to convene meetings accord· 
ing to the rhythm of negotiations. A 1979 amendment changed the words "shall meet at the 
call of the [USTR], before and during any trade negotiations" to "shall meet at the call of the 
[USTR]." Compare Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, § 135(d), 88 Stat. 1996 with Trade 
Agreements Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-39, § 1103(5), 93 Stat. 309. 
The only court to interpret language similar to the current version of§ 135 concluded that 
the relevant federal agency was not under an obligation to convene advisory committee 
meetings. See Dabney v. Reagan, 559 F. Supp. 861, 865 (S.D.N.Y. 1982). 
85. Members of consulted bodies may not be permitted to convey all the details of con-
sultations, but they are not prohibited from communicating all aspects of the policies under 
consideration to the interest groups that they represent. Section 135 provides that rules 
about information from the public sector should "to the maximum extent feasible permit 
meaningful consultations by advisory committee members with persons affected by [trade 
negotiations]." 19 U.S.C. § 2155(g)(3) (1994). 
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Second, advisory committee meetings in principle are not neces-
sarily confidential,86 so that a selective approach to secrecy may al-
low public scrutiny of whatever discussion in the meetings can be 
disclosed without infringing on the secrecy of the international ne-
gotiations required under the terms of the WTO DSU. 
Third, the requirement to convene committees during negotia-
tions also would enhance political scrutiny of the negotiations by 
involving not only the advisory committees but Congress as well. 
Section 135 requires that "in the course of consultations with the 
Congress ... information provided by advisory committees shall be 
made available to congressional advisers."87 Nego~iated settle-
ments would trigger this requirement to inform congressional advi-
sors because section 2211 of title 19 of the U.S. Code mandates 
consultations with Congress concerning "the resolution of trade 
disputes. "88 
Congress can remedy the shortcoming in the timing of advisory 
committee meetings by requiring committees to meet "at the call of 
the USTR and, when the USTR is negotiating with a view toward 
resolving a dispute susceptible of adjudication under the WTO 
DSU, during those negotiations." This adjustment would align, 
when WTO dispute resolution is concerned, the role of advisory 
committees in negotiated settlements under the Trade Act of 1974 
with the role Congress assigned these same committees regarding 
adjudicated settlements under the URAA, which requires advisory 
committees to meet "at each stage" of adjudicative proceedings.89 
Such a formal requirement to convene advisory committees 
might seem an excessive burden to place on the USTR, but current 
URAA provisions already impose most of this burden.9° First, 
though convening during negotiations will require many more com-
mittee meetings, the USTR must make the necessary adjustments 
in any case to accommodate the current URAA provisions requir-
ing consultations during each stage of WTO adjudicative proceed-
86. Infonnation submitted to advisory committees may be disclosed according to rules 
promulgated by the USTR. See 5 U.S.C. § 2155(g)(3) (1994). Also, advisory committee 
meetings are not necessarily closed to the public. Public-interest groups have sued to compel 
the USTR to rescind a blanket-closure order making all advisory committee meetings confi-
dential. See Public Citizen v. Kantor, No. 94-2236 (D.D.C. filed Oct. 17, 1994). For a de-
scription of the legal arguments presented in this suit, see Goldman, supra note 24, at 674. 
87. 19 U.S.C. § 2155(i) (1994) (emphasis added). 
88. 19 U.S.C. § 2211(c) (1994). 
89. See Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, § 127(a), 108 Stat. 4809, 
4835 (1994). 
90. Whatever the practical considerations, the requirement to seek advice from and con-
sult advisory committees does not appear to raise separation-of-powers issues. See Bybee, 
supra note 69, at 55 (contrasting statutory requirements of consultation with unconstitutional 
statutory restrictions of consultation). 
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ings.91 Second, under current DRAA provisions, the USTR must 
consult representatives of state governments during negotiations.92 
Those provisions require the USTR to give notice to government 
officials of concerned states that a foreign power has opened the 
WTO's pre-adjudicative negotiation process. Notice must be 
served within seven days of the opening of those WTO proce-
dures.93 Within thirty days of that opening, the USTR must "con-
sult with representatives of the State concerned regarding the 
matter."94 When the international negotiations involve the laws of 
a number of states, the USTR "may consult with an appropriate 
group of representatives of the states concerned, as determined by 
those States. "95 This means that the USTR will have to entertain 
the possibly divergent views of an ad hoc group of states.96 Advi-
sory committees, on the other hand, are standing bodies, requiring 
considerably less effort to convene. 
Thus, in light of these two current requirements of the URAA, 
the proposed additional requirement to convene advisory commit-
tees would appear to impose little cost, which, given the importance 
of WTO negotiated settlements,97 is well worth the gains that advi-
sory committees would offer. 
2. Extending the URAA Provisions Applicable to Adjudicated 
Settlements to Negotiated Settlements 
Congress should amend the URAA to extend to rulemaking 
pursuant to negotiated settlements the procedures currently appli-
cable to rulemaking pursuant to WTO adjudicative rulings.98 This 
section proposes a way to accomplish this objective: amending sec-
91. See Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, § 127(a), 108 Stat. 4809, 
4835 (1994) ("[T]he [USTR] shall, at each stage of the proceeding before the panel or the 
Appellate Body, consult with the appropriate congressional committees . • . and relevant 
private sector advisory committees established under section 135 of the Trade Act of 1974 
.... "). For discussion of the URAA consultation provisions, see supra notes 44-45, 47 and 
accompanying text. 
92. See Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, § 102(b)(l)(C), 108 Stat. 
4809, 4816-17 (1994). For a brief description of this provision, see supra note 47. 
93. See Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, § 102(b)(l)(C)(i), 108 
Stat. 4809, 4816 (1994). 
94. Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, § 102(b)(l)(C)(ii), 108 Stat. 
4809, 4816 (1994). 
95. Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, § 102(b)(l)(C)(ii), 108 Stat. 
4809, 4816 (1994). 
96. Also, the USTR first will have to go through the exercise of determining what state 
laws are likely to be affected. On the other hand, consulting advisory committees would 
occur under far more routine and convenient conditions. The USTR would consult advisory 
committees without having to discuss separately with each committee member and without 
having to go through the exercise of determining which state laws were affected. 
97. See supra Part I. 
98. See supra section III.B2. 
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tion 123(g)(l) of the URAA, which provides for scrutiny of agency 
rulemaking pursuant to WTO adjudicated settlements.99 The new 
section would provide that: 
In any case in which negotiations regarding an issue susceptible of 
adjudication under the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding lead 
to a commitment on the part of the United States concerning a regu-
lation or practice of a department or agency of the United States, that 
regulation or practice may not be amended, rescinded, or otherwise 
modified in the implementation of such negotiations unless and until 
that department or agency has complied with the terms of paragraph 
(1) above, except subparagraph (l)(A).100 The procedures required 
by those terms shall apply before the United States commits to 
amend, rescind, or otherwise modify any such regulation or practice. 
This amendment of the URAA would enhance democratic con-
trol over domestic policymaking growing out of negotiated settle-
ments in four ·ways. First, like the current URAA provisions 
governing agency implementation of adjudicated settlements, the 
provisions suggested above allow public input to guide the relevant 
agency in choosing among the regulatory alternatives permitted 
by the terms of the international commitment the agency is 
implementing. 
Second, the provisions suggested above impose political scrutiny 
before a final agreement emerges.101 The agency thus presumably 
99. Section 123(g)(l) currently provides: 
(1) CHANGES IN AGENCY REGULATIONS OR PRACTICE.-In any case in which a dis-
pute settlement panel or the Appellate Body finds in its report that a regulation or prac-
tice of a department or agency of the United States is inconsistent with any of the 
Uruguay Round Agreements, that regulation or practice may not be amended, rescinded, 
or otherwise modified in the implementation of such report unless and until-
( A) the appropriate congressional committees have been consulted under subsection 
(f); 
(B) the Trade Representative has sought advice regarding the modification from rele-
vant private sector advisory committees established under section 135 of the Trade Act of 
1974 (19 u.s.c. 2155); 
(C) the head of the relevant department or agency has provided an opportunity for 
public comment by publishing in the Federal Register the proposed modification and an 
explanation for the modification; 
(D) the Trade Representative has submitted to the appropriate congressional commit-
tees a report describing the proposed modification, the reasons for the modification, and a 
summary of the advice obtained under subparagraph (B) with respect to the 
modification. 
Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, § 123(g)(l), 108 Stat. 4809, 4831 
(1994) (emphases added). 
100. Section 123(g)(l)(A) is not incorporated by reference into proposed§ 123(g)(l)(B) 
because the proposed subsection refers specifically to the adjudicative process. It requires 
that Congress be consulted during adjudication not only at the stage of agency action. 
101. This scrutiny results from the last sentence of the proposed new section, which re-
quires the oversight procedures to apply "before the United States commits." The URAA 
contains no such requirement as to rulemaking pursuant to adjudicated settlements because a 
panel ruling is not negotiated and so cannot be renegotiated. However, the URAA's provi-
sions governing adjudicated settlements do contain a roughly analogous requirement requir-
ing the USTR to "consult with the appropriate congressional committees concerning the 
nature of any appeal that may be taken of [a WTO ruling]." Uruguay Round Agreements 
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would propose rule changes on the basis of a draft settlement. This 
would allow some possibility of influencing the content of the final 
agreement, rather than just influencing whatever choices the terms 
of the agreement happen to leave open. 
Third, the public nature of the rulemaking procedures proposed 
in this section would reinforce the efficacy of the consultations that 
occur during negotiations. During negotiations, the Executive is 
more likely to give appropriate weight to the views of its critics on 
the advisory committees if U.S. negotiators know that they will 
have to face the "constituencies" of those critics in an ensuing pub-
lic debate. 
Finally, the procedures prescribed to oversee rulemaking go be-
yond the public-notice-and-comment provisions that normally 
would apply under the APA absent agency invocation of the 
foreign-affairs exception.102 The rulemaking procedures of the 
URAA that this section proposes to extend to rulemaking pursuant 
to negotiated settlements require the agency to submit rule changes 
to advisory103 and congressional committees.104 In particular, the 
procedures allow congressional committees to cast a nonbinding 
vote against the proposed rule.105 Such a vote, if negative, often 
may be enough to send the negotiating agency back to the bargain-
ing table to obtain a settlement more consonant with domestic 
political sentiment. 
CONCLUSION 
The purpose of drawing attention to the influence of negotiated 
settlements on the formulation of domestic rules is not to protest 
the institutionalized influence of the world-trading system upon do-
mestic policy. In a world characterized by an increasingly global 
economy, some loss of sovereignty is inevitable. In an era when 
one nation's choices increasingly affect the welfare of others, the 
United States has done well to participate in institutions that for-
malize the ability of nations to influence each other's policies. The 
trick, however, is to relinquish sovereignty without compromising 
Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, § 123(f)(2), 108 Stat. 4809, 4831 (1994). This requirement regard· 
ing adjudicated settlements and the one proposed here regarding negotiated settlements are 
roughly analogous in that both promote the same general concern to impose political scrutiny 
before the writ of international law becomes final. 
102. On the foreign-affairs exception, see supra note 17. 
103. See Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, § 123(g)(l)(B), 108 Stat. 
4809, 4831 (1994) (quoted supra in note 99). 
104. See Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No.103-465, § 123(g)(l)(D), 108 Stat. 
4809, 4831 (1994) (quoted supra in note 99). 
105. See Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, § 123(g)(3), 108 Stat. 
4809, 4832 (1994) (quoted supra in note 72) (incorporating by reference in the provisions 
governing rulemaking pursuant to negotiated settlements proposed in this Note). 
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democracy. As has been suggested in this Note, the United States 
could improve in this regard, particularly when negotiated settle-
ments require regulatory changes. By allowing executive-branch 
agencies to make rule changes in the course of clandestine negotia-
tions, the United States' current foreign-affairs regime fails to en-
sure democratic participation and accountability in the 
administrative state. The statutory amendments proposed in this 
Note accommodate the exigencies of diplomacy without foresaking 
direct public influence on domestic pop.cy. 
